Sospechas espartanas y la masacre, de nuevo by Paradiso, Annalisa
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 19, nº 37. Primer semestre de 2017. 
Pp. 257-269.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2017.i37.13
Spartan Suspicions and the Massacre, 
Again1
Sospechas espartanas y la masacre, de nuevo
Annalisa Paradiso2




While narrating Brasidas’ expedition to Thrace and the Spartans’ decision 
to send 700 helots to accompany him as hoplites, Thucydides refers to another 
episode of helots’ enfranchisement, followed however by their massacre. The 
association of the timing of the two policies is indeed suspect, whereas it is 
possible that in the second case the slaughter may have been carried out in 
different chasms in Laconia, rather than in the so-called Kaiadas, after dividing 
the helots into groups.
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Resumen
Mientras narra la expedición de Brásidas a Tracia y la decisión de 
los espartanos de enviarle 700 ilotas que le acompañaran como hoplitas, 
Tucídides refiere otro episodio de manumisión de ilotas, seguido empero 
de su masacre. La coincidencia de ambas medidas políticas es en efecto 
sospechosa, si tenemos en cuenta que en el segundo caso la matanza puede 
haberse llevado a cabo en desfiladeros diferentes de Laconia, y no en el 
llamado Kaiadas, tras dividir a los ilotas en grupos.
Palabras-clave: Tucídides, Esparta, masacre, Kaiadas.
1 This article has been improved through information and comments supplied by Yanis Pikoulas, 
Dimitris Roubis, and James Roy. I am grateful to them and to Maria Serena Patriziano, physical 
anthropologist, who provided the volumetric calculations.
2 (annalisa.paradiso@unibas.it) She is Lecturer of Greek History at the Department of European 
and Mediterranean Cultures, Architecture, Environment and Cultural Heritage of the University of 
Basilicata (Matera, Italy). She studies problems of Spartan and Lydian history and historiography.
258 Annalisa Paradiso 
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 19, nº 37. Primer semestre de 2017. 
Pp. 257-269.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2017.i37.13
Thucydides’ report of  the false liberation of two thousand helots followed 
by their  massacre is a perfect story of both suspicion and fear, and of their 
political outcome. In 424, he says, the Spartans were glad to send out some of the 
helots to accompany Brasidas on his expedition to Thrace for fear that the latter 
could exploit the Athenian occupation of Pylos for uprising. Soon after, he states 
that the Spartans’ policy toward the helots had always aimed at safeguarding 
themselves from this source of danger; in particular, the Spartans were afraid of 
the helots’ number and of their tendency to revolt. At the same time, Thucydides 
recalls an episode, vaguely situated in the past, yet inspired by the same fear 
and suspicion. He relates that the Spartans proclaimed a selection to be made 
of those  helots who would claim to have rendered the best services in war, in 
order to enfranchise them. However, the announcement was intended to test them; 
the Spartans thought that those people who were the foremost in asserting their 
freedom would be the most-spirited and most likely to attack their masters. Thus, 
they selected about two thousand helots, who crowned themselves with garlands 
and went round the temples. Not long afterwards, the Spartans put them all out of 
the way, and nobody knew how each of them was killed3. 
In this striking historiographical construction, fear occasions suspicion 
and suspicion in turn results in a cruel test. At first, fear and suspicion toward 
the helots is  the reason of their military engagement out of Sparta; at the same 
time these feelings constitute a general statement on the relationship between 
masters and “slaves”, and invoke an extreme, and surely not a conventional 
episode of violence. In Thucydides’ view, the arousal of such  feelings (and the 
promotion of the political measures that they impose) is due to the disproportion 
between the Lacedaemonians and the helots. This lack of symmetry explains why 
fear and suspicion are ascribed to the masters rather than to the “slaves”. The 
Lacedaemonians tested the latter, because they suspected them; the helots did 
not suspect the former and so accepted the test. The Lacedaemonians organized 
a false examination of ‘titles’ in order to grant a false freedom; the helots took 
the test for true and underwent it voluntarily. The helots’ lack of suspicion clearly 
belongs to the historical content of the report. On the contrary, their masters’ 
suspicion and fear seems to belong  to Thucydides’ interpretation of the event, 
namely, to the historiographical construction of the episode. Such a construction 
is apparently deduced from the facts, but in fact qualifies their interpretation. In 
this way, Thucydides draws the analogy between the two episodes, which are in 
fact very different. The successful experience of the helots sent to Thrace and 
3  Thuc. 4.80.2-5: καὶ ἅμα τῶν εἱλώτων βουλομένοις ἦν ἐπὶ προφάσει ἐκπέμψαι, μή τι πρὸς 
τὰ παρόντα τῆς Πύλου ἐχομένης νεωτερίσωσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε ἔπραξαν φοβούμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν 
σκαιότητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος (αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς εἵλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι 
μάλιστα καθειστήκει)· προεῖπον αὐτῶν ὅσοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γεγενῆσθαι σφίσιν ἄριστοι, 
κρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐλευθερώσοντες, πεῖραν ποιούμενοι καὶ ἡγούμενοι τούτους σφίσιν ὑπὸ φρονήματος, 
οἵπερ καὶ ἠξίωσαν πρῶτος ἕκαστος ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, μάλιστα ἂν καὶ ἐπιθέσθαι. καὶ προκρίναντες 
ἐς δισχιλίους, οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον ὡς ἠλευθερωμένοι, οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ 
ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη.
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then led back to Sparta and manumitted –the brasideioi– will be followed by a 
policy of collaborationism. However, such a policy, which is necessarily inspired 
by trust, completely diverges from the cruel, and false, manumission of the two 
thousand helots, followed by their slaughter which is said to have been imposed 
by fear and suspicion. Thus, the analogy between the two different events results 
in the distorted interpretation of the former (the enrolment of 424) in the light of 
the latter (the previous massacre), and provides an  achronical interpretation, by 
Thucydides, of the bad relationship between Spartiates and helots. Of course, a 
bad relationship between the two is conceivable, but still  needs to be analysed 
in an historical context; any relationship has its own  prehistory. For instance, a 
bad relationship is  likely at the time of the great earthquake of ca. 464, which 
triggered a massive revolt chiefly by the  Messenian helots. On the contrary, a 
bad relationship cannot be assumed in 425, when the helots accepted to bring 
food to the hoplites besieged at Sphacteria nor in 424 when the Spartiates had 
trained, at least for some weeks or months, the helots they would send with 
Brasidas as hoplites. They also provided them with weapons which would have 
been dangerous in their hands, had the massacre be committed only some years or 
decades before4. Still in this historiographical construction, both the vocabulary 
(ἀφανίζω, a hapax in Thucydides with the meaning “to murder”) and the final 
sentence (“nobody knew how each of them was killed”) belong to Thucydides’ 
interpretation rather than to the “neutral”, and historical, content of the report. 
Such a vocabulary, though pointing out the obvious concealing of the ex-helots’ 
corpses, draws the picture of a mysterious, and terrible, murder.
Thirteen years ago, I suggested a revised interpretation of this episode and 
its historiographical construction, by arguing that either the Spartiates or the 
helots may have exaggerated, and so controlled, the information circulated for 
a small massacre for propagandistic reasons5. As a matter of fact, I was not the 
first to doubt the historical truth of the massacre as accounted by Thucydides, 
since Richard Talbert, Michael Whitby, and Simon Hornblower had preceded 
me6. I myself pointed out the contradictions of Thucydides’ account  and  the 
difficulty to execute in secrecy such a big massacre.  Above all, I underlined 
the inconsistency of the massacre with the policy of collaborationism, which 
was inaugurated in 424 and  was successfully practised afterwards through the 
formation  of new social groups of enfranchised helots, such as the brasideioi, 
4  As to the period when the massacre was carried out, various dates have been suggested, that is 
as early as the 470s or 460s, between 451 and 447, or closer to 424 (for a résumé, cf. Paradiso 2004: 
187 and Harvey 2004: 201). At the time of the Pylos-Sphacteria episode, freedom was officially 
granted to all those who would carry food to the Spartans besieged in the island (Thuc. 4.26): the false 
manumission of Thuc. 4.80 seems the accomplishment of that promise, but cannot be it, because of 
the contemporary policy of enrolment and collaborationism.
5  Paradiso 2004. See also Paradiso 2008.
6  Cf. Talbert 1989: 24-25; Whitby 1994: 97-99; Hornblower 1996: 267, and now Welwei 2011: 498 
n.156. See also Rhodes 1998: 266. A different approach has been adopted by Cartledge 2001: 128-30 
(= Cartledge 2003: 20-3); Idem 2002 (1979): 211; Harvey 2004; Cartledge, Debnar 2006: 565: all of 
them recognize the historical truth of the episode itself.
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then the neodamodeis, the aphetai, the adespotoi, the desposionautai etc7. As far 
as the second argument is concerned, I am still persuaded of the impossibility 
of enrolling (as volunteers!) the closest relatives and friends of the slaughtered 
helots, only some years or even few decades after a massacre which must have 
concerned so many hilotic family groups. This seems to me to be the strongest 
argument against the historical truth of Thucydides’ report8. On the other hand, 
the massacre itself may have been  complicated, but still not impossible to be 
carried out. Although it was not easy to do away with so many able-bodied 
men, still  a well-organized military body could do it. The true difficulty was 
to accomplish the massacre without leaving any traces, this means to  conceal 
the corpses. The core of the report is Thucydides’ remark that “nobody knew 
how each of them was killed” (οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη), 
where every “passive actor” (i.e. slaughtered helot) and every “spectator” of this 
information, either Spartiate or helot, are singled out, allowing one to suppose 
that only a limited number of Lacedaemonians and nobody among the helots, 
were aware of it. This difficulty was perceived by Ephorus, who “corrected” 
Thucydides and rationalized the murder by arguing that it was  accomplished by 
the Spartan kratistoi at each helot’s house, in secret 9. Accordingly, a reassessment 
of the material circumstances of the massacre itself is needed, in the light of the 
updated publications on both the topography of Laconia and some human skeletal 
remains that have been discovered in a chasm near Sparta.
As David Harvey has pointed out, 2,000 people fill 40 English buses, each 
of which usually contains 50 persons10. Possible ways of getting rid of so many 
people have been reviewed but most of them must be ruled out, since they are 
improbable or lack secrecy11. For example, hanging in prison, which was an 
historical form of capital punishment in Sparta, must be excluded, because it is 
impossible to carry away, out of everybody’s sight, 2,000 corpses hung inside, 
even during the night12. Poisoning, stoning, and stubbing must be also excluded, 
along with starving. Generally speaking, all the methods that involve the 
conveyance of dead bodies (which are more difficult to conceal) may be excluded. 
In particular, stabbing, for instance by the young kryptoi, may be ruled out since 
a small number of newly-trained neoi who underwent a more advanced initiation, 
not open to everybody, and were only armed with a dagger, could neither control 
so many people nor slay them and later hide their corpses13. Of course, those ex-
helots, who were veterans, were older than the kryptoi but, possibly, still quite 
7  Thuc. 5.34.1; Xen., Hell. 3.1.4 and 3.4.2; Myron of Priene FGrH/BNJ 106 F 1. See Paradiso 2008.
8  Helots as volunteers: Thuc. 4.26.5.
9  Ephorus is transmitted by Diod. 12.67.4. See on it Paradiso 2004: 181-182.
10  Harvey 2004: 204.
11  For a review of such methods of killing , cf. Harvey 2004: 204-205.
12  In Sparta, executions were carried out during the night: Herodotus 4.146. The Spartiates debated 
on conveying to the Kaiadas only one corpse, that of Pausanias the regent: finally, they decided to 
bury him near the temple of Athena Chalkioikos, outside of which he had died. Cf. Thuc. 1.134.4.
13  Plut., Lyc. 28 attributes the massacre to the kryptoi. Cf. Paradiso 2004: 182-3.
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young and strong, at least in part, if they could prove their “titles” (the acts of 
bravery) and the Spartiates were afraid of either their neotes (“youth”) or skaiotes 
(“inclination to revolt”)14. Also drowning must be excluded, since it is unlikely 
to drown people and prevent corpses to float. Nor should it belong to the Spartan 
juridical culture. Certainly, the most convenient solution was to murder those 
helots in the very place where their corpses would have been concealed. Actually, 
the most likely way of carrying out such a huge massacre was by precipitation into 
an abyss. Greek sources know of a chasm near Sparta, named Kaiadas or Keadas, 
where criminals, convicts, and prisoners of war were dropped, likely along with 
weak newborns15. Both Thucydides and Pausanias point out its traditional, thus 
“official”, use by the Spartan government: the former while reporting the death of 
Pausanias the regent outside the temple of Athena Chalkioikos and the following 
debate about the place of his burial; the latter while dealing with Aristomenes 
who was  hurled into the chasm, along with fifty mates, and miraculously escaped 
from it at the time of the Second Messenian War16. 
The Kaiadas should be located between Messenia and Laconia, and precisely 
in Laconia. That may be deduced from the fact that Aristomenes, starting from Mt. 
Eira in Messenia, was caught while sacking the Spartan territory, more precisely 
the territory of Amyclae17. Soon afterwards, the Lacedaemonians cast him and 
his mates into the chasm, which was clearly located in the neighbourhood. Petros 
Themelis has identified the Kaiadas with a huge rent of tectonic origin, located at 
the entrance to the great gorge of Langada on the Taygetus and associated to it by 
an old, local tradition. More precisely, this rent is located on the Sparta-Kalamata 
road, on the boundary of modern Trypi, 12 km. NW of Sparta, at an altitude of 
750 mt 18. As a matter of fact, both the debate on the Kaiadas and its location are 
older and start with Octave Rayet’s survey19. The French archaeologist dismissed 
Curtius’ old identification with a cavern at Parori near Mystra because  the geology 
of the place did not match the features of Aristomenes’ Kaiadas, and identified 
the latter with the abyss in Trypi which he had explored in September 1879 20. 
Later on, his hypothesis was accepted by W.K. Pritchett.21 Themelis and the team 
14  On neotes and skaiotes, the two variants that appear in the textual tradition of Thuc. 4.80.4, cf. 
Paradiso 2004: 184 and n.39.
15  According to Plut., Lyc. 16.2, weak newborns were cast into the so-called Ἀποθέται, a chasm on 
the slopes of the Taygetus: it is likely the same as the Kaiadas.
16  Thuc. 1.134.4: … ἐς τὸν Καιάδαν, οὗπερ τοὺς κακούργους, ἐσβάλλειν; Paus. 4.18.4 (from 
Rhianus) ῥίψαι … ἐς τὸν Καιάδαν· ἐμβάλλουσι δὲ ἐνταῦθα οὓς ἂν ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τιμωρῶνται.
17  Paus. 4.18.3-4.
18  Themelis 1982 (but 1984) and Id. 1985. See also Archaeological Reports 31, 1984-1985, 24; 
ibidem 32, 1985-1986, 29 and, now, Cavanagh et al. 1996: 293 (HH 110). Coordinates of cave 
entrance according to the Greek Geodetic System of Reference: 352 .. 370 / 4.106.443 (Efstathiou-
Manolakou 2009, 18). 
19  Rayet’s report (a personal communication) has been quoted in full by Couat 1882: 344 (n. 2)-
346. It has been partly translated by both Pritchett 1985: 58-60 and Ogden 2004: 78 (n. 11)-79.
20  Curtius 1852: 252.
21  Pritchett 1985: 58-60. On the history of the modern identifications of the Kaiadas, see Pikoulas 
1988. 
262 Annalisa Paradiso 
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 19, nº 37. Primer semestre de 2017. 
Pp. 257-269.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2017.i37.13
who explored the abyss with him in 1983 –the geologist E. Kampouroglou, the 
speleologist J. Ioannou, and the physical anthropologist Th. Pitsios– provided a 
description of the vertical cave, which is located in a hill, on whose top was an 
ancient entrance. The present opening is a fissure that has been opened by an 
earthquake, on the northeast slope of the rocky projection, apparently in the 19th 
century: it lies at the top of a stairway of 118 steps. The abyss is c. 50 mt. long; 
1.5 to 3.5 mt. wide, and 18 mt. to 25 mt. high 22. During the scientific exploration, 
Themelis found human bones, spread all over the cleft, and above all scattered on 
the present ground, which were ascribed at first to 17 individuals. Interestingly, 
he discovered a skull fragment pierced by a bronze arrowhead23. Accordingly, he 
suggested in his 1982 article that the 2,000 helots could have been hurled into 
it24. This hypothesis has been judged as “intriguing” (by Daniel Ogden in 2004) 
or quickly challenged (by myself in 2004) but it has never been discussed in 
detail25. After 2004, many important publications have appeared. In 2008, Yanis 
Maniatis dated through radiocarbon two separate skeletal samples to the eighth-
fifth century BC26. In 2010, Pitsios published an important study on the sample 
skeleton material collected until then, within the Research Program of Keadas 
Cavern (Anthropological Museum of the Medical School of the University of 
Athens)27. From the human skeletal findings, he estimated a minimum number of 
46 individuals. That material mainly consists of male skeletons with biological 
age of 18-35 years: a small number of skeletons have an estimated age of above 40 
and 2 or 3 subadult skeletons belong to 12-17 year-old individuals. A sacral bone 
may be clearly ascribed to a female skeleton. Anthropological analysis has not 
confirmed the presence of newborn or infant bones. These results are compelling 
evidence that the chasm is the ancient Kaiadas, where convicts (cf. the pierced 
skull?) and/or prisoners of war (see the skull and above all the skeletons with 
biological age of 18-35 years) were executed. 
Failing a scientific excavation, one wonders whether that chasm could 
contain the bodies of the ex-helots as Themelis suggested, this means the bodies 
of (more than) 2,000 people. Possibly it could. However, we cannot provide a 
volumetric calculation of the Kaiadas: we can only calculate that two thousand 
people fill the volume of c. 120 m3  28. On the other hand, the material conditions 
22  So Pitsios 2010: 13: for a more detailed description, see E. Kampouroglou in Themelis 1982: 194-197.
23  Themelis 1982: 199-201. Cf. also Themelis 1984. 
24  Themelis 1982: 185 and Id. 1985: 56. 
25  Ogden 2004: 78 n. 11; Paradiso 2004: 186.
26  Maniatis 2008.
27  Pitsios 2010.
28  To calculate the volume of one single person, we suppose that the average height is 1.50 mt, the 
shoulder width is 50 cm and the average weight is 60 kg, and that the density of a body is 985 kg/m3. 
The volume (V = weight ÷ density) will be calculated according to the following proportion:
1 m3: 985 kg = x m3: 60 kg
x m3 = 60 ÷ 985 = 0.060 m3
If we apply this result to 2,000 people, we shall have:
2,000 x 0.060 m3= 120 m3 (Maria Serena Patriziano)
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of the precipitation raise doubts. Those charged with the murder should hurl 
the ex-helots down from the ancient opening, which is described by Rayet as a 
“rather small hole” (“trou assez petit”) if looked at from the ground of the cave, 
but it may have been wider in Antiquity. They hurled them in small groups, 
rather than one by one. Throwing all of them into the abyss in small groups, 
either dead (and so heavier) or alive (while moving or trying to escape), likely 
in haste to prevent and stop reactions, would not have been easy, since its walls 
do have many rough places or cavities and the bodies could be inserted at any 
stage, closing up the chasm itself. Moreover, the chasm is not perfectly vertical 
and has different gradients at different stages. It also features a minimal width of 
c. 1.5 mt. (according to Pitsios) which should obstruct further on the passage of 
the bodies29. Actually, bones have been discovered at all stages of the walls, on 
many of their projections, likely belonging either to those people who were hurled 
in from the upper opening but did not fall to the ground and remained hung on 
them, or to those who did not crush to the bottom but tried to escape from it and 
that confirms that the fall was not perfectly vertical. These geological features 
would have slowed the casting and also made it difficult, even if the massacre had 
been accomplished openly, at least in this cave. The point is not only whether the 
Kaiadas could generally contain 2,000 bodies, but also whether it could contain 
so many bodies, all hurled into it at the same time; although this is not impossible, 
it is clearly not so easy to be accomplished. 
From a different point of view, the massacre of so many people also seems 
problematical, if we suppose that it happened at Kaiadas. Problematical is actually 
its organization. First of all, the Spartans would have to  lead 2,000 people away 
from Sparta, the place of the enfranchisement, to the chasm,  in  the west, allegedly 
cheating them about the purpose of such an “expedition”. The (allegedly) cheated 
ex-helots could not have been led to the Kaiadas via the direct way, since the 
modern main road to Trypi and then Kalamata was built in the mid-20th century, 
whereas the ancient cart-road which joined Sparta to Messenian Pharai, crossing 
the Taygetus, passed to the south of it, as Yanis Pikoulas has shown in his 2012 
book30. If the Kaiadas was the traditional, and thus the official, chasm where 
people were executed, there must have been a track of some sort going past Trypi, 
but in this case it would be difficult to justify the diversion from the main road 
to the place that was well known to everybody for its use. Other roads were less 
suitable. For instance, two more ancient roads, one from Sparta up to Leuktron 
and another from Leuktron down to Pharai (Messenia), would have finally led 
back to Sparta, and so to Trypi again, travelling along the Pharai-Sparta road and 
taking then the same diversion to the Kaiadas. However, the Sparta-Leuktron 
road to Arcadia passed too north of the Sparta-Pharai one and it would have been 
too complicated to take it and later “come back” to Trypi: taking such a long route 
29  See the map in Themelis 1985: 55.
30  On the Sparta-Pharai road, cf. Pikoulas 2012: Road 87α (pp. 393-5), with the map.
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would have been nonsense31. Again, the Sparta-Kardamyle road also crossed the 
Taygetus, but to the south of the road to Pharai, and therefore 2,000 people would 
have been obliged to travel along a much longer way32. If the massacre was close 
to 424, one can suppose that the Spartans falsely enrolled the newly enfranchised 
helots for a campaign to Messenia, where the Athenians were installed at Pylos 
since 425 disturbing Laconia. However, it must have been impossible to travel 
along the track to the Kaiadas with carts. The military pretext is problematical 
also because nobody would have judiciously provided with arms people who 
were to be murdered soon afterwards: thus the ex-helots must have been deceived 
and led to the Kaiadas on a different pretext which did not involve access to 
weapons33. Finally, the executioners had to take them to the higher opening. Once 
their purpose became clear, they had to  keep them under control, preventing them 
from revolting or fleeing away, in order to kill them and cast their corpses into 
the chasm, or cast them alive, even partially. If we assume that not many Spartans 
were needed to lead the ex-helots to the Kaiadas, a by far bigger number of them 
should have been charged with the slaughter, possibly hidden nearby and waiting 
for the arrival of the ex-helots. The topography of the Kaiadas perfectly fits an 
ambush of hidden armed men, but the high number of the ex-helots would have 
made a full control of the massacre difficult, if not impossible. Thus, we cannot 
talk about a perfect carnage of all the helots , so that “nobody knew how each of 
them was killed”. Indeed, neither the number of the slaughtered people nor that of 
the slaughterers would have matched Thucydides’ remark.
Of course, there were other chasms which could be used for the massacre. 
According to Strabo, kaiatai or kaietoi was the name for any tectonic caverns 
in Laconia and one deduces from it that the Kaiadas was only the antonomastic 
chasm34. Nevertheless, other rents were certainly used: Thucydides knows of a 
φάραγξ, a precipice possibly located near the sea, where the Spartans threw the 
corpses of some merchants who had been taken as prisoners while sailing around 
the Peloponnese at the time of the Archidamian war35. Though this was not an 
emergency execution into the precipice, it reveals alternative practices. Laconian 
caves and sinkholes have been reviewed by Ioanna Efstathiou-Manolakou in 2009. 
Most of them have been located so far on the west side of the Mani peninsula and 
on the east side of the Malea one. Nearer to Sparta, on the west of Mt Parnon, 
are other caves such as that of Papa Giannakou close to the village of Goritsa, 
31  On both the Sparta-Pellana-Leuktron road, and the Leuktron-Pharai one, cf. Pikoulas 2012: 
Roads 12 and 18 (pp. 111-5 and 127-9)/Roads 19 and 88β (pp. 131-3 and 403-7), with the map. 
32  Cf. Pikoulas 2012: Road 89, pp. 409-11, with the map. 
33  According to Critias 88 B 37 DK, the Spartiates at home took care to keep the helots disarmed, 
lest the latter seize them. 
34  Strabo 5.3.6 τὰ γὰρ κοῖλα πάντα καιάτας οἱ Λάκωνες προσαγορεύουσι and 8.5.7 οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν 
σεισμῶν ῥωχμοὶ καιετοὶ λέγονται. Cf. also Hesychius κ 208 Latte s.v. καίατα: ὀρύγματα ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ 
σεισμῶν καταρραγέντα χωρία. For Strabo 8.5.7, the Kaietas is a cavern (σπήλαιόν τι) that may be used 
as a prison. He stresses the seismic origin of such caverns. In 8.8.4, he considers Sparta as an area of 
high seismical risk (Stiros, Jones 1996: 133).
35  Thuc. 2.67.4.
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or that on the Leodakianaki Plot in the village of Geraki or an unnamed one in 
Karitsa. Farther from Sparta, on the other hand, is the cave named Troupitses at 
Skortsinos, on the boundary with Arcadia.36 Not all of the explored or excavated 
caves are huge nor vertical: some are horizontal and preserve material showing 
they were once inhabited. Some of them preserve human bones, which may belong 
to primary or secondary burials. In other words, none of the reviewed caves seems 
fit for such a massacre. However, the Spartans could have used for it another cave 
in Laconia, so far unknown: other chasms must be located on the Taygetus. If 
this were the case, the Spartans  should be certain that this “alternative” chasm 
could contain so many bodies; for this was an exceptionally large-scale massacre. 
Therefore, they should know its huge dimensions so  well as they knew those 
of the “official” Kaiadas, and that is not impossible37. Additionally, the chasm 
should be located not far from one of the main roads of Laconia, but the ones that 
could be travelled along by so many people. Further on, that road should run not 
at great distance from Sparta, again for  preserving the secrecy of the operation. 
That may be inferred from the very location of the Kaiadas itself, lying on the 
mountains, isolated, but not so far from Sparta, and quite easily reachable from it 
via an important road and a useful track. Therefore, the Sparta-Pharai road itself, 
which crossed the Taygetus chain with its gorges and chasms, or even the Sparta-
Sellasia one would have been more suitable than other roads to the far north (e.g. 
to Pellana) or to the even farther south (to the two peninsulas of Mani and Malea). 
As we have seen, the Sparta-Kardamyle road also crossed the Taygetus, but too 
far south of the road to Pharai, which means that 2,000 people would have been 
obliged to travel along a much longer way. A further possibility would have been 
the road from Sparta to Geronthrai, and the one from Geronthrai to Karitsa, near 
which at least two vertical caves have been identified (the Leodakianaki cave, 
looking like a pothole, that has been only located through a reconnaissance, and 
the small cave in Karitsa, which has a vertical entrance and dates back to Archaic 
and Classical times; however, it has only been explored, not excavated, and seems 
to have been a cult place)38. All those roads, possibly leading to an alternative 
chasm, located not so far from Sparta, would have been easily travelled along by 
so many people. However, a massacre accomplished in a different abyss would 
have been as problematical as the one in the Kaiadas. 
If a massacre took place, it was only accomplished by dividing people into 
groups. Apart from the difficulties in leading 2,000 people to one place and murdering 
them, Thucydides’ text itself  provides indirect evidence for this assumption. The 
expression “each of them” (ἕκαστος) leads  one to think precisely of such a way of 
murder, otherwise the emphasis on the individual death would get completely lost in a 
36  Cf. the map of Laconia showing the location of the caves in Efstathiou-Manolakou 2009: 6 
fig.2.1.
37  As it seems, Rhianus’ source knew very well the topography of the Kaiadas.
38  Pikoulas 2012: Road 28α (pp.167-169) and Road 28β (pp.171-173); Pikoulas 2012: Road 38 
(pp. 229-231). 
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case of mass murder39. Indeed, a massacre accomplished in this way would suit better 
the reviewed difficulties. The people charged with it would have led the freed helots, 
separated into groups, away from Sparta to different places. Dealing with smaller 
groups sent to various places, would be the sole way to keep such a military operation 
under control and would have made it easier. Such places of execution should be 
located not at great distance from Sparta. Once again, this may be inferred from the 
location of the Kaiadas itself. That executions took place not far from Sparta is also 
proved by Pausanias’ report on Aristomenes being caught at Amyclae and cast into 
the nearby Kaiadas, and not elsewhere, along with his fifty mates40. However, official 
executions were not secret, so one can guess that the exceptional slaughter of (the 
groups of the) 2,000 ex-helots would have been held far from Sparta, in other words 
away from public control. Yet, there is still the problem of both military and political 
secrecy. We do not know how many people were aware of the massacre, beside those 
who decided it and those who carried it out, unless the two were more or less the 
same people, as Ephorus thought. We can guess nonetheless that they were not many. 
Thucydides’ “nobody” (οὐδείς) mirrors the point of view of the helots. However, the 
division of the helots into multiple groups in order to be sent to multiple sites, nearer 
or farther, across a densely populated country, automatically multiplies the occasions 
of letting the other Lacedaemonians and the helots understand what was happening. 
As it is perfectly known from both literary and archaeological evidence, the helots 
were settled, along with their families, in the kleroi of their masters, hence scattered in 
the countryside, and accordingly their social organization made them able to control 
information over the territory. An intensive archaeological surface survey, the Laconia 
Survey, has recently explored an area of some 70 km2 to the east of Sparta towards Mt. 
Parnon, where as many as 87 Late Archaic and 46 Classical sites were discovered41. 
Their inhabitants, who are thought to have been either helots or perioikoi, lived in a 
large number of dispersed settlements, mostly farmsteads of small dimensions. In 
the western sector of the surveyed area, the one closest to Sparta, those settlements 
were likely land owned by Spartiates and cultivated by their helots42. Such a rural 
landscape could have put in danger the secrecy of the operation, especially if it started 
from Sparta. However, the groups of ex-helots could have been led mostly to the west 
of Sparta, to the Langada Pass and then to Messenia, that is, to a high, quite isolated 
place with more caves and precipices than the Kaiadas, and then to a country less 
thinly inhabited and populated43.
39  Harvey 2004: 205.
40  Thucydides’ merchants cast by the Spartans into a φάραγξ seems a different instance. They 
must have been caught far from Sparta, executed in the place itself, and later dropped into the nearest 
precipice (2.67.4). The precipitation of Aristomenes and the fifty warriors is instead the most similar 
instance to the murder of the 2,000 ex-helots, were they divided into small groups.
41  Catling 2002: 151-256. 
42  Cf. Catling 2002: 228-238; Hodkinson 2003.
43  The Pylos Regional Archaeological Project, which surveyed the area of 40 km2 in western 
Messenia, c. 70 km. from Sparta, only discovered five definite Archaic and four definite Classical sites 
that were anyway larger than the Laconia sites. In the Pylos area, the inhabitants, mostly helots, lived 
less scattered and concentrated in a small number of larger settlements. See Alcock et al. 2005: 156-
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In conclusion, Thucydides’ report, as it has been conceived, is a pure 
construction and not the perfect mirror of an historical event: it is the sophisticated 
interpretation of two events, connected through the use of tools such as mystery, 
suspicion, and fear. As a matter of fact, there are two possible interpretations of the 
situation: either the massacre did happen, possibly by killing groups of ex-helots, 
and of course was well known to both its promoters and executioners and likely to 
a larger number of people as well, or it did not happen and accordingly “nobody 
knew how each of them was killed”. It is not at all plausible that such a huge 
massacre was carried out undercover and remained unknown to both the helots’ 
families and all the Spartans, except for those who decided and accomplished 
it, since the number of people involved as victims, actors, and “spectators” was 
indeed very big. Anyway, a massacre may have been held, the murder of few 
people, as I suggest, or more people: the material conditions allow one to admit 
it. It is the timing of both the massacre and the enrolment that induces us to 
doubt the mass murder. It is the close timing of two contradictory political and 
military decisions, as it is laid out by Thucydides, which allows one to question 
his assessment of the Spartan achronical fear and suspicion of the helots’ menace. 
        
169, and, for an interpretation of all the Laconian and Messenian data, Hodkinson 2011-2014: 14-15.
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